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Philadelphia Chapter of Pax Christi U.S.A.
All the discussion about the the politics surrounding the Senate's October 13 rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a distraction from the real issue: the significance of the Treaty itself and what its rejection says about the direction of U.S. military planning.
The treaty establishes a permanent worldwide ban on all nuclear explosions, by anyone, for any reason -even for so-called 'peaceful purposes'. Besides being a prerequisite for abolition·, it is considered an essential step toward preventing the spread of nuclear weapons because test explosions are necessary for weapons development (To create its arsenal, during the·period 1945-1992 the United States conducted 1030 tests, an average of one every 17 days for 48 years.)
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The treaty was finalized in Geneva in September 1996, the culmination of an international effort under UN auspices and the realization of a goal of every U.S. President since Eisenhower, It has been signed by 157 countries (including the U.S:), each of which must ratify it as a final expression of acceptance.
Among its important details, the treaty specifies the means by which compliance with its provisions will be verified It establishes a system of listening stations around the world to monitor for nuclear explosions. Besides satellite observations, four different kinds of earth-based sensing devices will be employed. They use state of the art technology, deemed acceptable by all the signatory nations. The treaty also provides for on-site inspections, should suspicion of testing arise.
Verification is certainly a legitimate concern; it is reasonable to want assurances that cheating will not occur. But absolute certainty is not achievable, and insisting on it is one way of guaranteeing that there will not be arms control treaties. So, while there may be some who sincerely question the adequacy of verification measures, the issue is also a powerful tool in the hands of those who oppose arms control for other reasons. Charging that verification provisions are inadequate can create paralyzing questions in the public mind that are not easily resolved, even though they are unwarranted How good is the verification system in this treaty?
The monitoring technology has been developed and tested over
many years, so the possibility of having nuclear explosions go
) undetected is extremely low. And even ifthat were to happen, the tests would have to be so small that they are unlikely to
have military significance. That's the consensus view among international experts.
The essential qu on is: where does security lie? Ina world where weapons development is constrained by clear international prohibitions, including reasonable verification measures, or in a nuclear weapons free-for-all where there are no rules and everyone is free to devel9p weapons as they please? That is the choice which this treaty presents.
That choice extends beYond this one treaty. Is the world made safer through arms control agr,;:ements (of which the Test Ban is but one example) or is it better to pursue military doininance? -with the implied assumption that it will last forever.
Even from a purely pragmatic view, the choice would seem to favor arms control where nations, in pursuit of mutual security, accept constraints on their own behavior in exchange for similar restraint by others.
Human history is a narrative of continual change, of constantly shifting relationships, where even seemingly invincible 'superpowers' are inevitably replaced by others. Nothing is permanent.
The horizon which should concern us extends well beyond the foreseeable future in which the U.S. is so dominant. The choice being made today is·whether the world will become thoroughly nuclearized -a condition which, once established, is likely to be intractable -or whether it will move instead toward abolition of nuclear weapons. Indeciding that, nothing is more crucial than United States behavior.
That's why the recent Senate 'debate', brief though it was, was so disturbing. Even those who supported the treaty spoke ofit as a way of"locking.in U.S. nuclear superiority" as if that were a good thing, for us or for anyone else.
The discussion revealed a clear presumption that nuclear weapons are a 'given', a permanent presence in our liVes. The treaty was viewed as a non-proliferation mechanism
-a way of preventing additional nations from acquiring nuclear weapons, thereby threatening our dominance- rather than being seen as an essential first step toward doing away with them entirely. That distinction is extremely important
Preventing development of new weapons -by ourselves or anyone els -is a step which should be taken immediately, and thus we pray that the Test Ban treaty will be reintroduced and ratified by the Senate. But then what?
Abolition is widely perceived as virtually impossible, largely because of a belief that others outside would block our best efforts in that direction. But the reality is that our country
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is the single greatest obstacle to nuclear disarmament today. It is not even a goal we seek
Yet if, after ratifying the Test Ban, the United States were to call for negotiations toward full nuclear disarmament, the world would smelyfollow -enthusiastically, ifthe gesture were unambiguously sincere. That is not to suggest that actually acoomplishing that goal would be easy, but willingness to participate in the quest would be virtually universal.
Certainly the people of the world yearn for,and deserve, such a simple, direction-setting initiative. And those most competent to judge its achievability assure us that it is
doable, and have expressed their readiness to help bring abolition about (Several such people -scientists, diplomats, military officers - have been discussed in previous newsletters .)
Unfortunately, there is no immediate prospect that our untry will lead the world away frordthe destructive path we are on. Nuclear weapons are the centerpiece ofU.S. military
Catholic Peace Fellowship
planning, and there is every indication that they will remain so. Military spending has ihcreased substantially, with more promised And soon a so-called Ballistic Missile Defense (B:MD) system appears likely to move from research to actual implementation . Initially limited, its proponents envision it growing into an elaborate system with space-based 'battle
management' capabilities -Star Wars reborn.
Hunkering down behind our shield, prepared to unleash violence on an unimagineable scale "if necessary", pointing at others as the source of evil which compels us to further militarize our society. It is all so tragic, as spiritually destructive to ourselves as it is threatening to the future of humanity.
The dark logic of the Bomb provides only a seductive illusion of security. Ironically, it is in dehberately turning away from itsfalse allure that hope lies. Helping to bring about
that change of direction is the task before us. c [Tom O'Rourke]
